This paper presents an application of mean field control to dynamic production optimization. Both noncooperative and cooperative solutions are considered. We first introduce a market of a large number of agents (firms) with sticky prices and adjustment costs. By solving auxiliary limiting optimal control problems subject to consistent mean field approximations, two sets of decentralized strategies are obtained and further shown to asymptotically attain Nash equilibria and social optima, respectively. The performance estimate of the social optimum strategies exploits a passivity property of the underlying model. A numerical example is given to compare market prices, firms' outputs and costs under two two solution frameworks.
Introduction
Mean field game theory is effective to design decentralized strategies in a system of many players which are individually negligible but collectively affect a particular player (see e.g., [18] , [19] , [22] , [31] ). By identifying a consistency relationship between the individual's best response and the mass (population macroscopic) behavior, one may obtain a fixed-point equation to specify the mean field. This procedure leads to a set of decentralized strategies as an ε-Nash equilibrium for the actual model with a large but finite population. By now, mean field games have been intensively studied in the LQG (linear-quadratic-Gaussian) framework [18] , [19] , [11] , [39] , [12] ; there is also a large body of works on nonlinear models [22] , [32] , [3] , [14] . For further literature, readers are referred to [17] , [43] , [44] for mean field models with a major player, [46] for oblivious equilibria proposed for large-scale Markov decision processes of industry dynamics, [42] for mean field games with Markov jump parameters. For a survey on mean field game theory, see [3] , [14] , and [4] . Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean field control have been investigated in some literature [20] , [45] . Mean field games and control have found wide applications, including smart grids [34] , [7] , [26] , fiThis paper was not presented at any IFAC meeting. Corresponding author Bingchang Wang.
Email addresses: bcwang@sdu.edu.cn (Bingchang Wang), mhuang@math.carleton.ca (Minyi Huang). nance, economics [46] , [15] , [6] , [23] , operation research [28] , [1] , [33] , [36] , and social sciences [29] , [21] , [2] , etc. This paper aims to present an application of mean field control to production output adjustment in a large market with many firms and sticky prices. Under the stickiness assumption, the price of the underlying product does not adjust instantaneously according to its demand function, but evolves slowly and smoothly. Dynamic game models for duopolistic competition with sticky prices were initially proposed by Simaan and Takayama [38] , and then extended to investigate asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium prices in [13] . In [5] , [47] , the authors considered open and closedloop Nash equilibria for dynamic oligopoly with N firms and compared prices' behavior in and outside the steady-state levels, respectively. Adjustment costs in production models have been addressed in the economic literature (see e.g. [35] ) and they have been taken into account in the study of dynamic oligopoly [10] , [37] , [24] . The work [10] introduces a duopoly where each firm has output level subject to control according to a first-order integrator dynamics. However, when the number of firms is large (e.g. in a perfectly competitive market) and the adjustment cost is considered, the computational complexity of output adjustment is high. In the mean field control framework, one can effectively address the complexity issue.
Within our model, a large number of producers supply a certain product with sticky prices, and the output adjustment incurs a cost. The cost function of a firm is based on product cost, price, and adjustment cost. In [41] , we combined the price and firm's output as a 2-dimensional system. Thus, the cost function has indefinite state weights, which differs from many existing LQG models of mean field games in the literature [19] , [42] . In this paper, the price in the mean field limit model is taken as an exogenous signal without the need of state space augmentation. This contributes to deriving a simple condition that ensures the solvability of the resulting equation system.
The Nash equilibrium and the social optimum are two fundamental solution notions to competitive markets with many firms, where the former applies to the noncooperative model, and the latter is for the cooperative model. In this paper, we design Nash and social optimum strategies for the production output control model based on the mean field control methodology, respectively, and further compare two solutions numerically. The Nash solution of our model starts by solving a limiting optimal control problem and next applies the consistency requirement for the mean field approximation. We then obtain a set of decentralized strategies and show that the set of strategies is an ε-Nash equilibrium. For the social optimum solution, we first provide an auxiliary optimal control problem by a person-by-person optimality approach, and then design a set of decentralized strategies by solving the limiting auxiliary problem subject to consistent mean field approximations. The set of strategies is shown to be asymptotically socially optimal by exploiting a passivity property of the underlying model.
An illustrative numerical example is given to compare market prices, firms outputs and optimal costs under the game and social optimum frameworks. It is numerically shown that the social optimum has a lower average output level than that in the noncooperative case. This is similar to the behavior in a duopoly model [48] where cooperation of the two players results in a lower total output than in the Cournot equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the game and social optimum problems with N players. In Section III, we first design a set of decentralized strategies by the mean field control methodology and then show its asymptotic Nash equilibrium property. In Section IV, we construct a set of decentralized strategies, which is shown to be asymptotically socially optimal. In Section V, a comparison of two solutions is demonstrated by a numerical example. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: · denotes the Euclidean vector norm or matrix spectral norm. For a matrix M, |M| denotes the determinant of M. C([0, ∞), R n ) denotes the class of n-dimensional continuous functions on [0, ∞); C b ([0, ∞), R n ) is the class of bounded and continuous functions;
is the σ -algebra generated by the collection of random variables;
For two sequences {a n , n = 0, 1, · · · } and {b n , n = 0, 1, · · · }, a n = O(b n ) denotes lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | ≤ C, and a n = o(b n ) denotes lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | = 0. For convenience of presentation, we use C,C 1 ,C 2 , · · · to denote generic positive constants, which may vary from place to place.
Problem Description

Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices
Dynamic game models for oligopolistic competition with sticky prices were initially proposed by Simaan and Takayama [38] , and then further investigated in [13] , [5] , [47] . According to the model in [5] , [47] , the sticky price evolves by
where q j is the output of firm j, j = 1, · · · , N, and has the role of control. The payoff function of firm i is described by
The constants α, β , δ and c are positive, and c is the cost of unit output.
Output adjustment in a mean field framework
The paper considers a large market of many firms. Based on the formulation of sticky prices in [13] , [47] , we assume that the price evolves by
where α > 0 denotes the speed of adjustment to the level on the demand function, and
is the average of firms' outputs. The output of each firm is described by the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
where {w i (t), i = 1, · · · , N} are independent standard Brownian motions, which are also independent of initial outputs of all firms {q i (0), i = 1, · · · , N}. The constants α, β , µ and b i are positive.
Adjustment costs in production models have been addressed in the economic literature (see e.g. [35] ) and they have been taken into account in the study of dynamic oligopoly [10] , [9] , [37] , [24] . The work [10] introduces a duopoly where each firm has output level q i subject to control u i according to a first order integrator dynamics. In the resulting differential game, the instantaneous payoff of each firm is determined from its net profit minus quadratic penalty terms of q i and u i
Remark 1 As in [13] , β − q (N) is the price on the demand function for the given level of firms' outputs. In the static case, the inverse demand function has a linear version p = β − δ q (N) ; here for simplicity we set δ as 1. The scaling factor 1/N for q (N) is standard in modelling and analysis of large markets, and some closely related price modelling in a large dynamic market can be found in [30] , [40] . µ is used to indicate friction in adjusting the output, and w i is random shocks in output.
The cost function of each firm is given by
where
, r > 0 and 0 < c < β . Here, c denotes the production cost, and ru 2 i (t) denotes the adjustment cost. The minimization of J i (u) is equivalent to maximizing the payoff
We only consider the case β > c to make the subsequent optimization problems be of practical interest. Otherwise, given a positive q (N) , the production cost already exceeds the price, and the optimization problem is not too meaningful.
The social cost is defined as
Based on costs (3) and (4), one may formulate a standard LQG game and an optimal control problem, respectively. A limitation of this approach is that the control strategy will be centralized. Our goal is to look for decentralized strategies for the corresponding optimization criterion.
The basic objective of this paper is to seek Nash solutions and social solutions to mean field production output control with sticky prices. Specifically, we study the following two problems:
Problem I: Find ε-Nash equilibrium strategies for agents to minimize the individual cost J i over the set of decentralized strategies
Problem II: Find asymptotic social optimum strategies for agents to minimize J (N) soc over the set of decentralized strate-
For a large market, a natural way of modeling the sequence of parameters b 1 , · · · , b N is to view them as being sampled from a space such that this sequence exhibits certain statistical properties when N → ∞. Define the associated empirical distribution function
We introduce the assumptions.
A1) The initial price p(0) = p 0 > 0 is a constant. The initial outputs of all firms {q i (0), i = 1, · · · , N} are independent.
A2) There exists a distribution function F(·) such that the empirical distribution F N converges weakly to F, where
N} is contained in a fixed compact set Θ, and Θ θ dF(θ ) = 1.
Nash Solutions to Output Adjustment
Optimal control for the limiting problem
Accordingly, by replacing p in (3) withp we define the cost function:
The corresponding admissible control set is U d,i .
We first takep as an exogenous signal and solve the problem in (2), (5) and (6) . For a general initial condition q i (t) = q i at time t, define the value function
We introduce the HJB equation:
Then the optimal control law is
Substituting the control (8) into (7), we obtain
This yields
Lemma 1 k i = 0 is the unique solution to the algebraic Riccati equation (9) such that −µ −
Proof. By solving (9), we have
If
Remark 2 The inequality in Lemma 1 specifies a stability condition for the closed-loop system which must be satisfied by the solution of k i .
Theorem 1 For the optimal control problem in (2), (5) and (6), assume thatq ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R) is given. Then we have 1) there exists a unique solution s i ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R) to (10); 2) the optimal control law is uniquely given byū i = − b i r s i ; 3) there exists a unique solution g i ∈ C ρ ([0, ∞), R) to (11) , and the optimal cost is given by
. We can prove parts 1) and 3) by showing that s i (0) and g i (0) are uniquely determined from the fact s i ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R) and g i ∈ C ρ ([0, ∞), R), respectively (see e.g., [17] , [19] ). To show part 2) we first obtain a prior integral estimate of q i (see (12) ) and then use the completion of squares technique (see e.g., [20] , [45] ). By Lemma A.1, E ∞ 0 e −ρt u 2 i dt < ∞ implies E ∞ 0 e −ρt q 2 i dt < ∞, which further gives thatJ i is well defined to be finite sincē 
Control synthesis and analysis
Following the standard approach in mean field games [18] , [19] , we construct the equation system as follows:
In the above, θ is a continuum parameter.q θ is regarded as the expectation of the state given the parameter θ in the individual dynamics. The last equation is due to the consistency requirement for the mean field approximation. p(0) = p 0 , q θ (0) = q 0 and s(0) is to be determined. For further analysis, we make the following assumption.
A4)
There exists a solution (s,q θ , θ ∈ R) to (13)- (16) such that for each θ ∈ R, both s andq θ are within
Some sufficient conditions for ensuring A4) may be obtained by using the fixed-point methods similar to those in [18] , [19] .
Proof. By (13)- (15), we havē
Thus,q
It follows that T is a contraction and hence has a unique fixed pointq ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R). 2
The case of uniform agents
We now consider the case of uniform agents, i.e., b i ≡ b, i = 1, · · · , N. In this case, (13)- (16) reduce to the following equation:
By direct computations, we have
and the equation Mz +b = 0 has the solution
Note that
In what follows, we use Routh's stability criterion [8] to determine the number of roots of |λ I − M| = 0 with negative real parts. The first column of the Routh array for |λ I −M| is
. It can be verified that the first column of the Routh array always has a sign change. By Routh's stability criterion, (18) has a root with a positive real part, and two roots with negative real parts.
Let λ 1 , λ 2 be two roots of (18) with negative real parts, and ξ 1 , ξ 2 be the corresponding (generalized) complex
where λ 3 is a root of (18) with a positive real part and ξ 3 is the corresponding complex eigenvector. The solution
if and only if a 3 = 0, where h i (t) are polynomials of t. From the analysis above, we have the following result. 
ε-Nash equilibrium
Consider the system of N firms. Let the control strategy of firm i be given bŷ
where s ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R) is determined by the equation system (13)- (16) . After the strategy (20) is applied, the closed-loop dynamics for firm i may be written as follows:
Theorem 2 For the system (1)- (2), if assumptions A1)-A4) hold, then the closed-loop system (21)- (22) satisfies
Proof. By (22) , it follows that
From this together with (21), we have dp
By s ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R) and elementary linear SDE estimates, we have
By (13), (15) and (25), we have
By solving this linear SDE and using the fact that G is Hurwitz, we can show
which leads to (24) . 2
By the above theorem, we can obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 1 For the system (1)- (2), if assumptions A1)-A4) hold, then the closed-loop system (21)- (22) satisfies
We are now in a position to show an asymptotic Nash equilibrium property. Denote
Theorem 3 For the problem (1)-(2), assume that A1)-A4) hold. Then the set of strategies (û 1 , · · · ,û N ) given by (20) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Social Solutions to Output Adjustment
We first construct an auxiliary optimal control problem by examining the social cost variation due to the control perturbation of a single agent. Then, by mean field approximations we design a set of decentralized strategies which is shown to have asymptotic social optimality.
An auxiliary optimal control problem
We now provide a property of the social optimum problem which implies that J
soc has a minimizer.
Lemma 2 J (N)
soc (u) is coercive with respect to (u 1 , · · · , u N ), i.e., there exist constants C 2 > 0 and C 3 > 0 such that
Proof. From Lemma B.2, we can get the lemma immediately. 2
This lemma ensures the existence of a centralized optimal solution to the social optimum problem in (1)- (2) and (4) (see [27] ).
We now derive an auxiliary optimal control problem from the original social optimum problem by perturbing the strategy of a fixed agent. Denote the control problem (P1):
soc where eacĥ u i ∈ U c , thenû i is necessarily the optimal strategy of Problem (P1).
Proof. It follows from (3) that
By (1),
Thus, Y i = Z i + Z i where 
Mean field approximation
To approximate Problem (P1) for large N, we construct the auxiliary limiting optimal control problem (P2):
with cost function
Hereq ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R) is a deterministic function, which is an approximation of q (N) for large N.
For the system (28)- (29), we takep as an exogenous signal.
Lemma 4J * i (u i ) is strictly convex and coercive.
Proof. For the system (28)- (29), the state is (q i , v i );p andq are not dependent on the control u i . We can directly show thatJ * i (u i ) is strictly convex in u i . Following the proof of Proposition A.1, we can show thatJ * i (u i ) is coercive. 2
By Theorem 1, Lemma 4 and [27] , Problem (P2) has the unique optimal control given by
, and y θ = y i . y θ is regarded as the expectation of (q θ , v θ ) T given the parameter θ in the individual dynamics. Following the standard approach in mean field control [19] , [20] , we construct the equation system as follows:
For further analysis, we assume A5) There exists a solution (š, y θ , θ ∈ Θ) to (30)-(33) such that for any θ ∈ Θ, bothš and y θ are within
For the case of uniform agents (b i ≡ b), the equation system (30)-(33) reduces to dp dt
By straightforward computation, we can show M s ϕ +b s = 0 has a unique solution, denoted as z s . Furthermore, we have
By Routh's stability criterion [8] , we obtain that |λ I − M s | = 0 has two roots with positive real parts, and three roots with negative real parts. Denote
Note that [p(0),ỹ(0)] T is given. There exists a unique solution (ǎ 1 ,ǎ 2 ,ǎ 3 ) to (39) if and only if ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 and ϑ 3 are linearly independent.
From the analysis above, we have the following result. 
Asymptotic optimality
Consider the system of N firms. Let the control strategy of firm i be given by
whereš ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R 2 ) is determined by the equation system (30)- (33) . After the strategy (40) is applied, the closedloop dynamics for firm i may be written as follows:
Theorem 4 Assume that A1)-A3) and A5) hold. The set of strategies
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
We now give a closed-form expression of the asymptotic social cost.
Theorem 5 Assume that A1)-A3) and A5) hold. Then the asymptotic optimal social cost is given by
Proof. From Lemma B.1 and Schwarz's inequality, it follows that
Let J * i (ǔ i ) be the optimal cost of Problem (P2). By Theorem 1, we have
By Schwarz's inequality and Lemma B.1,
Notice thatǧ θ (0) is continuous in θ . By the weak convergence of F N to F, we obtain
which together with (44) and (45) completes the proof. 2
Numerical Simulation
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the evolution of firms' outputs and compare prices, average outputs and optimal costs under two different solution frameworks: the mean field game and social optimization.
Let p(0) = 1, and q i (0) ∼ N(2, 0.2). By (19), we have a 1 = 1.4429 + 7.8552i and a 2 = 1.4429 − 7.8552i; by (39), we getǎ 1 = 9,ǎ 2 = −3.5906 − 6.5046i andǎ 3 = −3.5906 + 6.5046i. Thus, we can write the exact expressions of s andš.
It can be verified that A1)-A5) hold. Figs. 1 and 2 show the curves of output levels of firms within the two frameworks, respectively. They remain positive, although random fluctuations appear and there are greater fluctuations in the social optimum framework. After the transient phase, the output levels of the firms behave similarly. Fig. 3 depicts the curves of p andp within game and social frameworks, when the total number of agents is 50. Fig. 4 shows the curves of q (50) and q (∞) within two frameworks, where q (∞) =q is the average output of firms in the infinite population case. It can be seen that the curves of p andp as well as q (50) and q (∞) coincide well, which illustrates the accuracy of the mean field approximation. From the game framework to the social framework, the price gets a significant increase, and the average of outputs becomes lower. By Theorem 1, we get that the asymptotic Nash cost is given by
, 
From (37), we obtainλ 1 = −α and ζ 1 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1] T , which implies ζ
The comparison of the two costs is shown in Tab. 1 and Fig. 5 . It can be seen that the asymptotic Nash cost J
Nash is greater than the optimal social cost J (∞) soc , and more so when α increases. This illustrates that the collusion of firms leads to rise in the price and drop in outputs and costs [48, p. 467] . 
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies dynamic production output optimization with sticky prices and adjustment costs based on the mean field control methodology. By consistent mean field approximations, we first present the Nash solution for noncooperative firms, and then give the social solution, where agents cooperate to optimize the social cost. The two sets of decentralized strategies are shown to approximate Nash equilibria and social optima, respectively. For future work, it is of interest to consider dynamic production output competition with noisy sticky prices.
Thus, by Cauchys inequality and A3),
where δ 1 is a sufficiently small positive number. Notē Proof. For u i ∈ U c , we have
From this it follows that
where G is defined in (26) . Noticing that G is Hurwitz, by basic estimates as in the proof of in Lemma A.1, we obtain
From this together with Theorem 2, it follows that
which with Lemma A.1 implies
Combining this together with (A.4) and (A.5) yields
Let N 0 = inf{m ∈ Z|m > C/ε 0 }. From this inequality, we obtain that there exists a constant C 2 such that for all N ≥ N 0 ,
Proof. By Schwarz's inequality,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. It suffices to show the first inequality in (27) 
It follows from (A.4) that
By (A.6), (A.7) and Theorem 2,
which with Lemma A.1 further implies
On the other hand, by Lemma A.3 we havē
Thus, the first inequality in (27) follows from (A.9) and (A.10). 
Proof. It follows from (42) and (43) that
Notice that A is Hurwitz andš ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R 2 ). By elementary linear estimates and A3) we can show that there exists a constant C 0 independent of (i, N) such that
which further gives sup t≥0 E |q (N) (t)| 2 ≤ C 0 . This together with (41) leads to (B.1). By (42) and (43), we have
It follows from (30) and (B.3) that
By (30) and (41) we have
which leads tǒ
This together with (B.4) gives (B.2). 2
Lemma B.2 There exist constants C 1 > 0,C 2 > 0 and C 3 > 0 such that
Proof. By A3), assume |b i | ≤b, i = 1, · · · , N. From (2), we compute
Thus, by Cauchy's inequality,
where δ 1 is a sufficiently small positive number. Note
From (B.5) we have By (1), (2) and (41)- (43) This completes the proof. 2
